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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
All arbitration agreements shall inform patients of their right to consult with an 
attorney and the right to compel mediation prior to arbitration. Dr. Abdulla's arbitration 
agreement does not inform patients of their rights to obtain an attorney and compel 
mediation. 
Patients hold no power to bind non-signatory heirs to participate in arbitration, 
prior to revision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2003). Dr. Abdulla's arbitration 
agreement binds third party non-signatories. 
One individual cannot unilaterally terminate the constitutionally guaranteed rights 
of another. Dr. Abdulla's arbitration agreement unilaterally terminates Lisa Bybee's 
constitutionally guaranteed rights to jury trial and court access for resolution of her 
constitutionally protected right to suit for wrongful death. 
Substantive unconscionability invalidates arbitration agreements where the 
agreement imposes terms unreasonably favorable to the other party. Dr. Abdulla's 
arbitration agreement eliminates the right to jury trial for his patients, but retains that 
same right for himself. 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2003) Appendix 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2004) Appendix 2 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dr. AbduUa first treated Mark Bybee for allergies in December 1998. (R. 20). 
After treating Mr. Bybee for nearly five years, Dr. Abdulla required Mr. Bybee to sign an 
arbitration agreement on May 23, 2003. (R. 20). Dr. Abdulla continued acting as Mr. 
Bybee's primary physician for the treatment of allergies until October 2003, when Mark 
Bybee sought treatment from Dr. Abdulla for his depression. Dr. Abdulla, despite never 
having previously treated Mark Bybee for mental illness, nonetheless attempted to render 
care for Mr. Bybee's depression by prescribing the medication Zyprexa. (R. 1). 
On November 24, 2003, without any direct physical examination or interview of 
Mark Bybee, Dr. Abdulla refilled the prescription. (R. 2). Again, on December 8, 2003 
Dr. Abdulla refills the prescription without any examination or reevaluation of Mark 
Bybee's depression. On February 20, 2004 Mark Bybee killed himself. Following the 
death of Mr. Bybee, Lisa Bybee brought an action on behalf of herself, the couple's 
children and all other heirs of Mark Bybee. (R. 1-3) The defendant Dr. Abdulla sought 
to compel participation in arbitration based upon the agreement signed by Mark Bybee. 
Abdulla maintains his arbitration agreement "complies with all requirements found 
in both Utah Code §§ 78-14-17 and 78-31a-101, including all of the newly codified 
requirements found in the 2004 amendment." (Appellant's Brief at 3-4). However, under 
the 2004 Act arbitration agreements must, in writing, inform the patient of their right to 
seek advice of an attorney and their right to demand mediation prior to arbitration. 
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Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-17 (l)(a) (2004). Nowhere does the Defendant's 
arbitration agreement expressly inform patients of these rights. (R. 38, Appellant's 
Appendix 1). 
The arbitration agreement requires patients to give up their right of recourse to a 
judicial forum. Dr. Abdulla also requires patients to unilaterally compromise a spouse or 
heirs claim and right to be heard for wrongful death in our courts. However, Dr. Abdulla 
exempts himself from being compelled to participate in arbitration in order to pursue the 
only potential claim he could have against his patients, collection of fees. "Physician may 
pursue a legal action to collect any fee from the patient and doing so shall not waive the 
Physician's right to compel arbitration of any malpractice claim." (R. 38, Appellant's 
Appendix 1). At no point did Lisa Bybee, or the children or heirs, agree to give up their 
right to seek judicial redress for the wrongful death of Mark Bybee. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Abdulla's arbitration contract attempts to bind third-party claims of wrongful death 
heirs who are non-signatories to the underlying contract. In Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 
796, 800 (Utah 1998) the court observed that "while the public policy of promoting 
speedy and inexpensive resolutions of controversies favor arbitration in some cases, these 
considerations cannot outweigh the constitutional right of access to the courts unless one 
waives that right." Because neither Lisa nor the heirs agreed to substitute a private 
arbitration for their right to jury trial and court access to redress the constitutionally 
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protected claim of wrongful death, the arbitration agreement cannot be enforced against 
them. 
If enforced as urged by Abdulla, the Arbitration Agreement directly conflicts with 
Utah appellate court decisions requiring a "voluntary, intelligent and knowing waiver of 
both parties' Constitutional right to seek judicial redress." Jenkins, 962 P.2d at 799 ("the 
right to apply to the courts for relief for the perpetration of a wrong is a substantial right 
and cannot be waived through contract except in the most unequivocal terms"); Lindon 
City v. Engineers Const Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Utah 1981)(same); Bracken v. Dahle, 
251 P. 16, 20 (Utah 1926)(same). Under the 2003 version of the Act, there existed no 
express legislative permission or authority to bind third-party non-signatories to an 
arbitration agreement signed by a patient. Abdulla's position that the 2004 Act merely 
"clarified" pre-existing law fails in the face of these well established authorities. 
However, even if the 2004 version of the Act applied, arbitration agreements 
which waive a right to jury trial and court access must strictly comply with the statutes 
allowing their enforcement in the first instance. Prior to legislative recognition, this court 
frequently refused to enforce arbitration agreements governing future disputes. Here, 
Abdulla's arbitration agreement fails to satisfy legislative requirements that a patient be 
informed of their right to seek legal counsel, as well as their right to compel arbitration. 
Failing to comply with the statute which enables arbitration agreements to be enforced in 
the first instance, Abdulla's arbitration agreement cannot be enforced at all. 
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Further, construing the 2004 Act as urged by Abdulla creates a constitutional 
conflict with a wrongful death claimant's right to jury trial, court access and due process. 
A constitutional conflict only arises as a result of Abdulla's desire to ignore the Act's 
language which imposes arbitration only on those claims based 'solely' upon injury to the 
patient. Wrongful death claims are not based solely on injury to the patient, but also upon 
statutory and constitutional provisions creating an entirely new and independent cause of 
action in the heirs. 
Finally, arbitration agreements arising from unconscionable procedures, or 
imposing unconscionable terms, will not be enforced. In Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 
(Utah 1996) the court held an arbitration agreement signed shortly before surgery 
unconscionable and unenforceable. The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the 
burden of demonstrating that an enforceable arbitration agreement exists. Mohamed v. 
Auto Nation USA Corp., 89 S.W. 3d 830, 835 (Ct. App. Tex. 2002). This proof may not 
be by mere inference, but "direct and specific evidence of an agreement between the 
parties" is required. McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31, f 17, 20 
P.3d 901, 905. Here, Abdulla cannot demonstrate that his boilerplate and adhesive 
contract preserves procedural safeguards. Further, the contract itself imposes 
substantively unconscionable terms because it eliminates the rights of court access and 
jury trial for patients, but preserves and retains Abdulla's own right to court access and 
jury trial for collection of his fees. 
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ARGUMENT 
Introduction and Background: Consumer Arbitration Agreements 
Arbitration agreements originally arose in the commercial context as a means to 
reduce litigation costs between businesses dealing at arm's length. "Out of court 
arbitration was initially created so that parties, with equal bargaining power, could reduce 
the costs of litigation by agreeing to resolve their dispute through the use of a mutually 
acceptable arbitrator." Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: 
Consumer Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1191, 1191 (2001). However, arbitration now permeates many "agreements involving the 
'little guy's5 ... day to day needs (agreements concerning the purchase and sale of goods 
and services, including financial and medical services)." The Redefinition of Arbitration 
By Those With Superior Bargaining Power, 1999 UTAHL. REV. 857, 860 -863. 
Because the little guy typically must accept agreements to arbitrate without any 
ability to negotiate the terms, "we are at the point where, at least when the weaker party 
has no power to negotiate the existence or the terms of the arbitration clause, the weaker 
party needs some protection from the use of arbitration." Id. "While out of court 
arbitration may be beneficial for parties with equal contractual bargaining power, it is 
inherently unfair in situations where the parties exhibit a substantial disparity in power." 
Mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1194 -1195. 
Boilerplate arbitration clauses are now used to "undermine the enforceability of rights 
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potentially threatening to [the party in control of the drafting process]." Redefinition of 
arbitration, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 857, 867. 
Frequently, the argument is made that public policy favors arbitration agreements. 
However: 
the stronger party has redefined arbitration ... it may no longer be efficient, 
expeditious or accessible; and it may involve more than just the relinquishment of 
"procedural" rights. Arbitration has been corrupted; it has been used by the more 
economically powerful party to extract, often in an underhanded manner, unfair 
advantages and important substantive rights from the unwitting economically 
weaker party. 
1999 UTAH L. REV. at 864 -865. 
In the situation where the party providing the service requires an arbitration clause, 
the traditional safeguards of contractual fairness are missing. Contracting with 
Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury Claims 67-Spring LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 255. Because the traditional safeguards may be missing, a 
danger arises that arbitration will be enforced even where true consent is absent. Id. In 
the personal injury context, this danger threatens not only the rights of the injured party, 
but also "threatens the retributive, economic, and communitarian goals of tort law.5' Id. 
Our judicial branch first approached arbitration agreements with complete 
skepticism, an attitude which flows through even the most recent appellate court 
decisions. At one time, it was "almost the universal rule that in the absence of a statute to 
the contrary, an agreement to arbitrate all future disputes thereafter arising under the 
contract does not constitute a bar to an action on the contract involving such dispute, on 
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the ground that it seeks to deny to the parties judicial remedies and therefore is contrary to 
public policy." Latter v. Holsum Bread Co., 108 Utah 364, 368, 160 P.2d 421, 423 
(1945). 
Arbitration agreements run contrary to the expressed purpose and spirit of our 
judicial system by conferring final judicial authority on private arbitrators, tending to 
divest the official public courts of jurisdiction. Barnhart v. Civil Service Emp. Ins. Co., 
16 Utah 2d 223, 227-228, 398 P.2d 873, 876 (1965). In light of Utahfs constitutional 
guarantee to court access under Article I, Section 11, as well as the constitutional 
guarantee to jury trial under Article I, Section 10, courts should approach arbitration 
agreements with a healthy dosage of skepticism and scrutiny of the highest order. Id. 
Only after statutory amendment did Utah courts begin to give any real effect to 
arbitration agreements. See, Allredv. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 
1265 (Utah 1996). Nonetheless, even after legislation recognizing the validity of 
arbitration agreements, the original judicial skepticism runs strong and courts continue to 
scrutinize arbitration agreements in the consumer context where a stronger party forces 
the weaker party to accept arbitration. In McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 
2001 UT 31,115, 20 P.3d 901, the court refused to compel arbitration and observed that 
uthe policy of liberally construing agreements in favor of arbitration is conditioned upon 
the prior determination that arbitration is a remedy freely bargained for by the parties and 
[which] provides a means of giving effect to the intention of the parties." 
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I. THE ARBITRATION CONTRACT IN THIS CASE CANNOT BE 
ENFORCED UNDER EITHER THE 2004 OR 2003 VERSIONS OF 
THE ACT. 
Rather than directly attack the trial court's conclusion that the 2003 Act governed 
this arbitration contract, or demonstrate how this contract complies with 2004 statutory 
requirements, AbduUa offers only two semantic arguments which fail to resolve whether 
the trial court erred in this case. 
First, AbduUa argues that the Utah Arbitration Act "anticipates" binding non-
signatories because it applies to "[a] written agreement to submit any existing or future 
controversy."1 (Appellant's Brief at 11). However, construing the Utah Arbitration Act 
to apply to a decedent's heirs lacks support in the statutory language and violates 
fundamental constitutional rights of the heirs. Although the Arbitration Act admittedly 
validates the ability to arbitrate future disputes, this came about as a legislative response 
to the judiciary's skeptical attitude toward privatization of legal disputes. See, Barnhart 
v. Civil Service Emp. Ins. Co., 16 Utah 2d 223, 227-228, 398 P.2d 873, 876 (1965). No 
language in the Utah Arbitration Act expressly binds third party non-signatories and, in 
fact, the Utah Court of Appeals does not interpret the statute to bind non-signatories. 
1
 AbduUa incorrectly cites the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act as § 78-3 la-3. 
This section was repealed in 2002 and effective May 15, 2003, became number § 78-3 la-
107. AbduUa also alleges that arbitration agreements are enforceable under this section 
"except under certain conditions not found or argued here." On the contrary, Appellee 
maintains that the arbitration agreement in this case fails "upon a ground that exists at law 
or in equity" as more fully argued below regarding unconscionability. See, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3la-107(1) (West 2006). 
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Cade v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Utah App.,1998)("a party who has 
not agreed to arbitrate will normally have a right to a court's decision about the merits of 
its dispute.")(citation omitted). 
Further, legislation expressing a general approval of arbitration agreements cannot 
be interpreted so as to run afoul of constitutional rights. Construing the Utah Arbitration 
Act to bind non-signatory heirs to an arbitration agreement, thereby depriving them of 
their constitutional rights to court access, jury trial and redress for wrongful death, not 
only exceeds the scope of the Act's plain language, but violates the well-established rule 
requiring avoidance of constitutional conflict. See, State v. Mooney, 2004 UT 49,112, 
98 P.3d 420 (appellate courts hold "a duty to construe statutes to avoid constitutional 
conflicts."). 
Second, Abdulla suggests that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act "envisions 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements against persons other than the patient." (See, 
Appellant's Brief at 11). Abdulla construes the "all persons claiming damages" of Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-14-17(l)(b) (2004) to mean that everyone is automatically bound by 
arbitration agreements. However, the selected language comes from a subsection of the 
code designating the required provisions within an arbitration agreement before it will be 
held valid. It is not a statutory requirement that the entire universe of all persons 
therefore are bound by arbitration. Rather, the statutory language sets forth the provisions 
required to be contained in an arbitration agreement. For example, the subsection relied 
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upon by Abdulla also includes language that arbitration agreements require: (iv) rights of 
rescission; (v) length of the agreement, (vi) right to retain legal counsel; and, (vii) scope 
of the agreement. Abdulla's argument assumes the very issue before the court: whether 
or not non-signatories can be bound by the terms of the agreement. In short, the language 
"the agreement shall require" assumes there to be an agreement in the first place. Here, 
Lisa Bybee and the heirs have not agreed to arbitrate and, hence, there is no agreement on 
which to impose the requirements of subsection 78-14-17(b). 
Abdulla's semantic argument notwithstanding, the arbitration contract at issue in 
this case cannot be enforced because: (1) it attempts to bind non-signatories absent an 
authority to do so under the 2003 Act; and, (2) it fails to satisfy the 2004 Act's statutory 
requirements. See, e.g., Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 381 (Colo. 2003)("arbitration 
agreement is unenforceable against [heir], because the agreement does not comply with 
the [statutory] requirements set forth in the Colorado HCAA."). 
A. THE 2003 ACT DOES NOT EMPOWER PATIENTS AND 
PHYSICIANS TO BIND NON-SIGNATORY THIRD-PARTIES. 
Abdulla offers only a single conclusory paragraph, completely devoid of any legal 
authority, supporting the claim that the 2003 Act does not apply. In sum, Abdulla argues 
the legislature simply "clarified" prior law and did not "expand" the law by making 
arbitration agreements binding on all claims where "the sole basis for the claim is an 
injury sustained by [the patient]." (Appellant's Brief at 12). Abdulla then, by ipse dixit, 
concludes that application of the 2003 Act is not "a question of retroactivity." (Id.). 
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Abdulla offers no case authority or analysis of the provisions at issue and submits no 
argument other than the asserted conclusions. 
In the action below, Abdulla urged that the 2004 Act applied retroactively because 
it was merely a 'procedural' mechanism and a, 'clarification' of the law. (R. 93). Abdulla 
has apparently abandoned the procedural exception argument on appeal and urges only 
the 'clarification' exception to allow retroactive application of the 2004 Act. (Appellant's 
Brief at 12). Nonetheless, a review of the provisions at issue demonstrates that 
application of the 2004 Act as urged by Abdulla constitutes an impermissible retroactive 
change in substantive rights and not merely a 'clarification' of preexisting law. 
Under the former Act, there existed no express legislative authority to either (1) 
bind third persons not party to the contract or (2) bind an unborn child. Under the 
amended Act, legislative permission exists for binding "the unborn child of the person'1 
receiving treatment or "the claim of a person who is not a party to the contract if the sole 
basis for the claim is an injury sustained by a" person receiving treatment. See, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-17( 1 )(b)(vii)(B)(III) and (l)(b)(vii)(C) (2004). Prior to passage of 
the current Act, the 2003 Act granted no legislative power to bind either third parties or 
unborn children. 
Abdulla attempts to bind the third party heirs through retroactive application of the 
2004 Act. Although Abdulla claims this is merely a clarification, there can be no doubt 
that the choice to forego judicial resolution of disputes in favor of arbitration represents a 
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substantive right that cannot be taken away so easily. 
The clarification exception allowing retroactive application of a statute only comes 
into play when there exists an unresolved ambiguity within a statute. "Statutory 
amendments that merely clarify an ambiguity in an original statute will be given 
retroactive effect." Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
953 P.2d 435,440 (Utah 1997). Further, courts presume that legislative changes are 
intended to change existing legal rights. "Ordinarily, the presumption is that an 
amendment is intended to change existing legal rights." Visitor Information Center 
Authority of Grand County v. Customer Service Div., Utah State Tax Com'n, 930 P.2d 
1196, 1198 (Utah 1997). Abdulla adduces no evidence to support a claim that an 
ambiguity exists. Moreover, because the language in the 2004 statute is completely 
absent from the prior statute, there could not be an ambiguity in need of clarification. 
Abdulla fails to overcome the presumption against applying the clarification exception. 
Finally, the 2004 changes affected the fundamental rights to seek court redress for 
wrongful death. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 799 ("the right to apply to the courts 
for relief for the perpetration of a wrong is a substantial right and cannot be waived 
through contract except in the most unequivocal terms"). While the new statute may not 
have 'enlarged, eliminated or destroyed' any of Mark Bybee's rights, it most certainly 
affected the rights of the third party heirs, including minor children. Prior to the 
legislative grant of power, patients could not bind non-signatories. 
13 
The 2003 Act did not bind third-party non-signatory claims to arbitration. When 
Mark Bybee signed the arbitration contract, he held no statutory authority to unilaterally 
eliminate his heir's right to jury trial and court access because those provisions came into 
effect in 2004. In the absence of a statutory ability to eliminate these important 
constitutional rights of third parties, the arbitration agreement is void and cannot be 
enforced against Lisa Bybee. 
B. BECAUSE THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT FAILS TO 
COMPLY WITH THE 2004 ACT. IT CANNOT BE ENFORCED 
AGAINST ANYONE. 
The arbitration contract in this case also fails to comply with the 2004 Act's 
requirements and cannot be enforced. A contract which violates the express public policy 
of the legislative branch cannot be enforced by the judiciary. "There can be no doubt 
concerning the duty of this court to invalidate contracts which have a tendency to be 
injurious to the public welfare." Frailey v. McGarry, 116 Utah 504, 5165 211 P.2d 840, 
847 (1949). Public policy, as expressed by the Utah State Legislature, demonstrates that 
agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice claims cannot be executed without informing 
the patient of her right to consult with legal counsel, presumably before signing the 
agreement. "[T]he agreement shall require that... the patient has the right to retain legal 
counsel." See, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(l)(b)(vi) (2004). 
Abdulla's agreement fails to inform patients of the right to consult with legal 
counsel. Without informing patients of their right to consult with an attorney, a patient 
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cannot intelligently decide whether to revoke the agreement under the 10 day period of § 
78-14-17(a)(vii). Further, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(l)(a)(viii) states: "the patient 
shall be given, in writing, ...the right of the patient to require mediation of the dispute 
prior to the arbitration of the dispute." Nowhere does Abdulla's arbitration agreement 
inform patients of their right to demand mediation. 
The legislature chose to use the word shall with both these requirements. Other 
courts interpreting statutes permitting arbitration agreements in the medical malpractice 
context require strict compliance with the statutory requirements. See, e.g., Allen, 71 P.3d 
at 381 ("arbitration agreement is unenforceable against [heir], because the agreement does 
not comply with the [statutory] requirements set forth in the Colorado HCAA."); and, 
Ewald v. Pontiac General Hosp., 329 N.W.2d 495,497 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)("With 
failure of strict compliance with the statute, no valid arbitration agreement was formed."). 
Here, effect should be given to the mandatory requirements imposed by our legislature. 
By not informing patients of their right to counsel, patients may not fully understand the 
legal implications of waiving not only their substantial court access and jury rights, but 
also those of their heirs. Because Abdulla's contract fails to comply with the statutory 
requirements, no valid arbitration agreement was formed. 
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II. A PATIENT MAY NOT UNILATERALLY ELIMINATE AN HEIRS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO COURT ACCESS AND JURY 
TRIAL FOR REDRESS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PROTECTED WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM. 
The Utah Constitution protects the claim of wrongful death.2 The Utah 
Constitution guarantees both the right to court access3 and jury trial.4 "[T]he right of 
trial by jury should be scrupulously safeguarded." Abdulkadirv. Western Pac. R. Co., 7 
Utah 2d 53, 55, 318 P.2d 339 (1957). It would be unprecedented to allow a third-party to 
intentionally, through contract, modify, eliminate or control constitutional rights without 
permission of the individual to whom those rights belong. In Jenkins v. Percival, 962 
P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1998) the court observed that "while the public policy of promoting 
speedy and inexpensive resolutions of controversies favor arbitration in some cases, these 
considerations cannot outweigh the constitutional right of access to the courts unless one 
waives that right." Here, Appellant Abdulla seeks to eliminate Lisa Bybee and her 
2
 "The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall 
never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory 
limitation, except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided 
for by law." Utah Constitution Article XVI, Section 5. 
3
 Utah Constitution Article I, Section 11. "All courts shall be open, and 
every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party." 
4
 Utah Constitution Article I, Section 10. 
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children's constitutional rights by virtue of a contract to which they are not parties.5 
Appellant Abdulla relies extensively on Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1997) to establish the proposition that, because a decedent may deny his heirs 
of any recovery by allowing a statute of limitations to run, Mr. Bybee could unilaterally 
deprive his heirs of the ability to pursue their constitutional right to court access for 
redress of their constitutionally protected wrongful death claim. Jensen involved very 
difficult factual scenarios which included collusion amongst plaintiffs attorneys and 
defendant doctors to fraudulently deprive the plaintiff of their claims as well as attendant 
delays and prosecution of the claim. 
Importantly, Jensen only made wrongful death actions subject to some of the 
defenses which would have been available against the decedent. "[T[he wrongful death 
cause of action is based on the underlying wrong done to the decedent and may only 
proceed subject to at least some of the defenses that would have been available against 
the decedent had she lived to maintain her own action." Id. at 332. 
Jensen does not control or limit all actions flowing from medical malpractice. 
"Rather than establishing a uniform rule for all derivative malpractice actions... Jensen 
addresses the statute of limitations question solely in the wrongful death context, and we 
decline to adopt [the] suggestion that we expand its holding to include all derivative 
5
 Construing the Malpractice Act to permit elimination of an heirs right to 
pursue their fully vested claim also runs afoul of Utah's constitutional guarantee to due 
process. See, Utah Const, art I, § 7. 
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medical malpractice claims." Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, Tfl4, 94 P.3d 915. Put 
another way, Jensen addressed wrongful death solely in the context of a statute of 
limitations bar. Nonetheless, Abdulla contends that Jensen in effect establishes a uniform 
rule allowing a patient to eliminate the heirs constitutional guarantees and rights. Indeed, 
Abdulla goes so far as to assert that, under Jensen, a patient can unilaterally eliminate any 
and all rights heirs might have for wrongful death through settlement, compromise or 
stipulation. (See, Appellant's Brief at 8). Abdulla's argument stretches Jensen well 
beyond the express holding in Jensen and beyond any reasonable interpretation of that 
case. More importantly, Abdulla's argument runs contrary to statute. 
Under former Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 no legislative expression allowed a 
patient to bind third parties. See, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2003). The 2003 version 
was in effect at the time Mr. Bybee signed the arbitration contract. By contrast, under the 
2004 version, § 78-14-17(l)(b)(vii)(B) and (vii)(C) expressly allowed a patient to choose 
arbitration for "the claim of a person who is not a party to the contract if the sole basis for 
the claim is an injury sustained" by the patient. Id. Absent legislative empowerment to 
alter or limit the constitutional rights of third parties, there exists no basis on which to 
compel Lisa Bybee and her children to forego their constitutional right of court access for 
redressing the constitutionally protected wrongful death cause of action. In light of 
Dowling and the lack of legislative power allowing a patient to bind third parties, the trial 
court did not need to 'discuss' Jensen, 
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Further, assuming that § 78-14-17 could apply retroactively, interpreting the statute 
as Abdulla urges infringes upon constitutional rights. Applying the statute to eliminate an 
heirs right to court access and jury trial for wrongful death contravenes the constitutional 
protections afforded those rights. Moreover, applying § 78-14-17 to eliminate these 
rights before they even come into existence also violates due process.6 However, 
constitutional conflict can be avoided by interpreting the statute's language in a manner 
both consistent with the spirit of the statute as well as the constitutional rights at issue. 
Because injury to the patient does not form the sole basis upon which a wrongful 
death claimants cause of action exists, § 78-14-17 does not operate to control the heirs 
wrongful death cause of action. Under Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-17(b)(vii)(C) 
arbitration agreements may "only apply to: the claim of a person who is not a party to the 
contract if the sole basis for the claim is an injury sustained by [a patient]." Wrongful 
death claims, however, involve more than just an injury sustained by a patient. 
A wrongful death claim is "a new cause of action which runs directly to the heirs 
to compensate each for the individual loss suffered by the death.... [and] is a personal 
property right of the heir." Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244, 246 -247 (Utah 1980). In 
other words, the sole basis for a wrongful death claim is not merely injury to the patient, 
but also involves injury to the heirs and beneficiaries who lose the love society and 
companionship of the individual who died as a result of medical malpractice. Because 
6
 Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7 
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the sole basis for the claim is not merely injury to the patient, § 78-14-17 does not operate 
in a manner which eliminates the important and substantive constitutional rights of non-
signatory third parties. 
Courts are obligated to give effect to each of the words and phrases used by the 
Legislature within a statute. While interpreting a statute this Court seeks "to render all 
parts of the statute relevant and meaningful and we therefore presume the legislature used 
each term advisedly and according to its ordinary meaning. Consequently, we avoid 
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." State ex 
rel Div. of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Tooele County, ^ f 10, 44 P.3d 680 (citations 
omitted). Abdulla's argument effectively reads out of the statute the "sole basis for the 
claim" language. A wrongful death claim depends upon more than just injury to the 
patient and is in and of itself an entirely new cause of action. "The right of action at 
common law in favor of the decedent was based on one fact,-the wrongful act; but the 
right under the statute in favor of the heir is based on two,-the wrongful act and the 
death." Mason v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 7 Utah 77, 24 P.2d 796, 797 (1890). 
A more appropriate interpretation for the "sole basis" language, one which avoids 
constitutional conflict, would be to apply that language in the context of a survival action, 
as opposed to a claim for wrongful death. Under a survival action, a cause of action for 
personal injury does "not abate upon the death of the injured person... the personal 
representatives or heirs of the person who died have a cause of action against the 
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wrongdoer... for special and general damages." Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) (West 
2006). The sole basis for a survival action is in fact injury to the patient. It therefore 
makes sense that the legislature intended to apply arbitration agreements to survival 
actions. However, it makes no sense, and conflicts directly with constitutional rights, to 
interpret § 78-14-17 to control the wrongful death cause of action, an action which is not 
solely based on injury to the patient and an action which has not vested or even come into 
existence until after the death of the patient. 
III. WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS DO NOT BELONG TO THE 
DECEDENT. 
A wrongful death claim belongs to the heirs. Utah courts have long recognized the 
separate and distinct nature of wrongful death claims. Under Hailing v. Industrial 
Commission, 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78 (1927) the action itself belongs to the statutory heirs 
and not to the decedent's estate. "[T]he right of an employee's dependents to recover for 
wrongful injury resulting in the death of such employee is not the result of any contract. It 
is a constitutional right which cannot be denied dependents without their consent, except 
by a court or other judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction after notice given and a 
hearing had." Id. at 81.7 It follows that consent to arbitration and waiver of jury trial by 
7
 See, also, Mason v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 7 Utah 77, 24 P.2d 796 
(1890)(the heirs5 "legal rights were not invaded until death ensued, and then the statute 
gave them instantly a right of action to redress the losses following that invasion of their 
rights."); Hull v. Silver, 517 P.2d 103, 104 (Utah 1978)(holding that a wrongful death 
action "is not derivative" and cannot be limited by interspousal tort immunity); and, Haw 
v. Haw, 887 P.2d 878, 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(a decedent's estate could not maintain 
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the decedent can bind only the decedent and not the statutory heirs. 
Abdulla contends that "[a]s a general rule, the heirs of the decedent are bound by 
the contracts of the decedent. The most obvious example of this is a release of all claims 
by the decedent prior to death." (Appellant's Brief 7). Contrary to Abdulla's contention 
several authorities allow a wrongful death cause of action to be brought in spite of a prior 
adjudication or settlement by the decedent. "Injured persons may release their own 
claims; they cannot, however, release claims that are not yet in existence and that accrue 
in favor of persons other than themselves." Thompson v. Wing, 637 N.E.2d 917, 922 
(Ohio 1994). See, also, Hailing v. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78 
(1927)(where this Court held that the wife and other heirs of the deceased employee could 
pursue a claim for wrongful death even though decedent had pursued and lost a claim 
based on the same injuries); and, Earley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 167 P. 513, 513-14 (Cal. 
1917)(noting survival actions could be compromised by decedent, but that wrongful death 
actions cannot). 
Jensen reaffirmed that "an action for wrongful death is an independent action 
accruing in the heirs of the deceased." Jensen, 944 P.2d at 332. Jensen simply chose the 
more specific statute of limitations for medical malpractice as applicable to wrongful 
death claims. Id. Jensen did not elevate the status of the injured party to a lord with 
an action for wrongful death, claim belongs exclusively to heirs); and, Oxendine v. 
Overturf 1999 UT 4 % 9, 973 P.2d 417(same). 
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dominion over claims and rights which: (1) did not belong to him or her; and, (2) did not 
even exist yet as a claim which could be compromised. 
In Jensen this Court adopted the minority rule regarding a statute of limitations as 
it applies to wrongful death claims. As to the defense of the statute of limitations "the 
considerable majority of the courts have held that the statute runs against the death action 
only from the date of death, even though half that time the decedent's own action would 
have been barred while he was living." W. Page Keeton et aL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 127 at 957 (5th ed. 1984). Considering the circumstances 
surrounding Jensen and the holding itself, this Court should take this opportunity to reign 
in any expansion of what remains a minority view, applied in the very unique factual 
circumstances of that case. 
Indeed, several courts recognize that even the wholly derivative claim for loss of 
consortium cannot be compromised by the other spouse. Although some courts recognize 
a release by the injured spouse as binding on the non-injured spouse, "the more prevalent 
view seems to be that the loss of consortium suit is not barred as it is a separate and 
independent cause of action which is the property of the spouse and cannot be controlled 
by the injured person." 29 A.L.R.4th 1200, Injured party's release of tortfeasor as 
barring spouse's action for loss of consortium (1984). Spouse's are simply incapable of 
jeopardizing or limiting a claim to which they hold no interest. "[S]ince Mrs. Davis 
neither participated in nor signed the release, it cannot preclude her claim against 
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Huskipower for loss of consortium." Davis v. Huskipower Outdoor Equipment Corp., 
936 F.2d 193, 198 (C.A.5 1991). If the derivative claim for loss of consortium cannot be 
limited by a spousal release, then certainly the constitutionally protected rights of court 
access/jury trial and wrongful death cannot be unilaterally eliminated by Dr. Abdulla's 
arbitration contract. 
Abdulla relies on a string of 'exculpatory clause5 case law7. Abdulla cites Russ v. 
Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901, 905 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) which defined 
exculpatory clauses as relieving "one party from the risk of loss or injury in a particular 
transaction or occurrence and deprive the other party of the right to recover damages for 
loss or injury." Abdulla also relies on Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 4th 
748 (1993)(preinjury release/hold harmless by individual engaged in skydiving binding 
on heirs); and, Rowan v. Vail Holdings, Inc., 31 F Supp. 2d 889 (D. Colo. 1998)(skier's 
preinjury release/hold harmless contract binding on heirs.) (See, Appellant's Brief at p. 
8). These cases fail to advance an analysis of whether a decedent may eliminate the 
constitutional rights of his heirs. 
Exculpatory clause cases involve 'pre-injury' releases of liability whereby the 
tortfeasor would be released from all liability for injury as a result of negligence. These 
types of releases usually arise as part of engaging in some hazardous activity, such as 
skydiving or skiing. However, citation to exculpatory clause case law actually 
undermines argument that a decedent-victim of medical malpractice may barter away 
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constitutional rights of third party heirs. 
Exculpatory clause contracts waiving all claims of negligence by the patient 
against the physician are void as against public policy. See, Tunkl v. Regents of 
University ofCaL, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). Where an exculpatory waiver affects 
services within the public interest (e.g., common-carriers, residential leases, inns & 
hotels), such waivers will not be enforced. Factors in determining whether an exculpatory 
contract impermissibly infringes upon public interest include: transactions involving 
business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation;9 party seeking 
exculpation performs a service of great importance to the public; the service is a often a 
matter of practical necessity; the party holds himself out as willing to perform this service 
for any member of the public who seeks it; because of the essential nature of the service, 
8
 Abdulla also relies on Kulling v. Grinders for Industry, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 
2d 828 (E.D. Mich. 2000) and In re Estate of Shepley, 645 P.2d 605 (Utah 1982). 
Kulling involved Michigan law which holds that wrongful death claims are derivative. 
Id. at 852. The court rejected Plaintiffs argument that their claim was not subject to a 
release based on the fact that "Plaintiff seeks to have it both ways, arguing that the 
Michigan act confers separate, substantive rights upon the heirs of Mr. Kulling that are 
not displaced by the ADEA's remedial scheme, yet also arguing that this separate 
wrongful death claim is sufficiently 'derivative' of Mr. Kulling's ADEA claim that the 
protections of the OWBPA extend to the heirs' claims as well." Id. at 852-853. Kulling 
cannot advance any meaningful analysis in this case where the arguments and authority 
differ so greatly from the facts at bar. 
Shepley involved only the question whether an estate, as distinguished from heirs, 
could be bound by the decedents contractual agreement to pay attorney fees. (See, 
Appellant's Brief at 8-9). In that sense, Shepley is consistent with the idea that survival 
actions may be limited by decedent's contracts, but wrongful death claims cannot. 
9
 Utah law extensively regulates the practice of medicine. See, Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-67-101, etseq. (West 2006). 
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in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a 
decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his 
services; and, in exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public 
with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation; and, finally, as a result of the 
transaction, the person of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to 
the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents. Id. at 445-446. 
Not surprisingly, each of these factors mirror those when presenting a patient with 
an arbitration agreement, including the ability of Abdulla to withhold medical services if 
Mr. Bybee refused to sign.10 To the extent that exculpatory clauses might allow a 
decedent to preclude his heirs to bring a claim, that analysis fails when placed in the 
context of medical care, a public interest service. Tunkl refused to uphold an exculpatory 
clause in the medical context based on the above factors. After noting that inns and 
hotels cannot exculpate themselves from negligence, the Tunkl court concluded "[w]e see 
no cogent current reason for according to the patron of the inn a greater protection than 
the patient of the hospital; we cannot hold the innkeeper's performance affords a greater 
public service than that of the hospital." Id. at 447. To the best of counsel's legal 
research ability, no case exists where a court enforced a pre-injury release of liability 
signed by a patient. 
10
 See, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(l)(a)(iv) (2003)(which allows physicians 
to withhold treatment for refusal to sign an arbitration contract except in the emergency 
room context). 
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Tunkl voices those important policy reasons why adhesive contracts affecting 
substantive rights should not be enforced. Parties should certainly be allowed to arrange 
their affairs through private contract. However, the disparate differences in bargaining 
power between a patient and physician require careful scrutiny and review of the rights 
released. While insisting on an arbitration contract Abdulla exercised a decisive 
advantage in bargaining power, the ability to withhold medical care. Mr. Bybee, the 
would-be patient, was in no position to reject the proffered agreement. A doctors 
admission room, or for that matter, examination room, certainly contains no bargaining 
table where, as would occur in a private business transaction, the patient can debate the 
terms of the arbitration contract. Id 
Similarly, in the context of minor rights, parents cannot waive a minor's right to 
maintain an action for negligence by agreeing to exculpatory clauses on behalf of the 
minor. In Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062 (Utah 2001) this Court refused to allow a 
parent to unilaterally waive a minor's cause of action. The Hawkins court stated 
"[Defendant] has cited no source of law, and we are aware of none, granting parents in 
Utah a general unilateral right to compromise or release a child's existing causes of action 
without court approval or appointment to that effect." If a parent cannot waive a minor's 
cause of action for negligence, then Mr. Bybee cannot eliminate the constitutional rights 
of Mr. Bybee's children in this case. 
Abdulla argues that "[t]his Court should honor and enforce Mr. Bybee's right... to 
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commit all claims... to arbitration." (Appellant's Brief at 10). However, it is not solely 
Mr. Bybee's rights which are at stake. In the case at hand, the sole basis for the claim is 
not injury sustained by Mark Bybee. Rather, it is a claim for wrongful death, a claim 
which the statutory heirs did not agree to arbitrate. Prior to forcing a party to arbitrate, a 
court "must first conclude that arbitration is a remedy which has been bargained for by 
the parties. Only when such agreement on arbitration exists may we encourage arbitration 
by liberal interpretation of the arbitration provisions themselves." Cade, 956 P.2d 
1076-77. This principle must be especially honored because the Utah Constitution 
guarantees a wrongful death right of action. See, Utah Const, art. XVI, § 5. Because Lisa 
Bybee's claims do not depend solely upon injury, but instead upon separate and 
independent constitutional rights, the Malpractice Act cannot extend binding arbitration 
to govern her claim without eliminating those rights. 
Public policy supports limiting a wrongful death claim to the extent a statute of 
limitations has run or comparative fault of the decedent exceeds that of the tortfeasor. 
The mere fact that a claim involves the constitutional right to wrongful death does not 
eliminate all defenses and give the claimants a strict liability claim against defendants. 
On the other hand, it is entirely inappropriate to allow one individual to exercise control 
over the claims of another through contract, especially where those claims involve 
constitutional rights such as jury trial and court access. Public policy grounds support the 
ability of a spouse to maintain a loss of consortium claim, despite her husband's 
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settlement of that claim because he is master of only his claim. Public policy supports the 
ability of the heirs to maintain their constitutional right of access to a jury trial for the 
constitutionally protected claim of wrongful death despite an arbitration agreement by the 
decedent because the decedent is the master of only his claim, not the constitutional rights 
of his heirs. 
Abdulla cites a host of cases, claiming that "[c]ourts in other jurisdictions also 
agree that the heirs are subject to the contracts of the decedent in wrongful death actions, 
including arbitration agreements." (See, Appellant's Brief at 9, n. 2). A review of the 
cases cited shows that, in the consumer medical malpractice context, courts are not as 
willing to enforce arbitration agreements as Abdulla might hope. Of the 16 cited cases, 
six involved complex business transactions ranging from brokerage agreements to 
indemnity provisions governing Lloyd's insurance contracts over salvage of oil tankers. 
(See, Appendix "3"). The remaining ten cases involved consumer arbitration. (Id.). 
However, of those ten, three refused to actually enforce the arbitration agreement at issue. 
(Id.). Of the remaining cases, several enforced the arbitration provision because the 
claimants allegations depended directly on the contract which also imposed arbitration as 
a requirement. (Id.). See, e.g., Pelz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 367 F. Supp. 2d 711, 718-
19 (E.D. Pa. 2005)(Heirs 'equitably estopped' from escaping arbitration in contract which 
provided the very basis for the claim). 
Several of the cases relied upon by Abdulla originate in California. Interestingly, 
29 
one of those cases held that "[a]ll nonsignatory arbitration cases are grounded in the 
authority of the signatory to contract for medical services on behalf of the nonsignatory-to 
bind the nonsignatory in some manner." County of Contra Costa v. Kaiser Foundation 
Health Plan, Inc., 47 Cal.App.4th 237,243, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 632 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 
1996). Abdulla has not pointed to any authority held by Mark Bybee which enabled him 
to eliminate the constitutional rights of his wife and children in exchange for health care. 
Finally, none of the cases relied upon by Abdulla actually involved an assertion that the 
arbitration agreement impermissibly infringed upon the constitutional rights of the non-
signatory. 
By contrast, several courts refuse to enforce arbitration agreements against non-
signatory parties. In Ciaccio v. Cazayoux, 519 So.2d 799 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1987) a 
husband brought a claim for medical malpractice against a physician when his children 
died during childbirth. The wife had signed an arbitration agreement providing "any 
controversy arising out of claims based on negligence or medical malpractice between 
patient, whether a minor or an adult, or the heirs at law... shall be submitted to 
arbitration." Id. at 804. The physician attempted to compel the husband to participate in 
arbitration. The court refused to compel arbitration because "ordinary contract principles 
govern the question of who is bound by an arbitration agreement, and a party cannot be 
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required to submit to arbitration any dispute that he has not agreed to submit." Id.11 Utah 
courts similarly hold to this principle. Cade, 956 P.2d 1076-77. 
Where a physician seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement fails to meet the 
burden of demonstrating assent by the patient, the agreement will not be enforced. In 
Obstetrics and Gynecologists et. al v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985) the court 
affirmed a trial court's decision not to enforce an arbitration agreement against a patient. 
Characterizing the arbitration contract as 'adhesive' because no meaningful bargaining 
could occur, the court placed the burden on the clinic to demonstrate that the patient had 
agreed to the terms. Because the physician could not present evidence which compelled 
the conclusion that the patient knowingly assented, the agreement was unenforceable. 
Here, similarly, Abdulla cannot conclusively demonstrate that his take-it-or-leave-it 
arbitration contract was fully assented to by Mark Bybee. No one ever apparently read or 
explained the contract as demonstrated by the facts that: (1) Mark Bybee signed where 
there should have been a clinic employee's signature verifying explanation; and, (2) no 
signature by a clinic employee, necessary to verify the contract had been read and 
explained, appeared anywhere. (R. 21). Further, there can be absolutely no question that 
11
 See, also, Benjamin v. Pipoly, 800 N.E.2d 50, 2003-Ohio-5666, at ^ 36 
("Because arbitration is a matter of contract, a party cannot be required to submit to 
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit."); Peters v. Columbus Steel 
Castings Co., 2006 WL 225274, *5 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 2006)("because a wrongful 
death claim is independent from any claim the decedent could have pursued... wrongful 
death beneficiaries, who are not otherwise bound to an arbitration agreement, are not 
required to arbitrate simply because the decedent agreed to dp so.") 
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Lisa Bybee and the heirs had absolutely no opportunity to understand the implications of 
Mark's alleged waiving of their constitutional rights.12 The trial court in this case 
similarly correctly concluded that given the absence of evidence of assent, the arbitration 
agreement was unenforceable. 
The fundamental right to court access and jury trial cannot be waived without a 
voluntary, knowing and intelligent decision by the party to whom the waiver would apply. 
In Kloss v. EdwardD. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2002) the court refused to enforce 
an arbitration contract against a consumer in the broker-securities context. The court 
found that "[f]or a fundamental right [of jury trial] to be effectively waived, the individual 
must be informed of the consequences before personally consenting to the waiver." Id. at 
15. Lisa Bybee and the heirs did not personally consent to waive their rights to jury trial 
for the constitutionally protected claim of wrongful death. They did not even know those 
rights were in jeopardy until they sought to assert them. Because there is no knowing 
waiver of the rights by those who held them, the arbitration contract cannot be enforced 
against Lisa Bybee and the children of Mark Bybee. 
12
 See, also, Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 
1017 (Ariz. 1992)(refusing to enforce arbitration agreement against patient seeking 
abortion who "was under a great deal of emotional stress, had only a high school 
education, was not experienced in commercial matters, and is still not sure 'what 
arbitration is.'"). 
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IV. PUBLIC-POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
CANNOT SUPPORT UNILATERALLY ELIMINATING THIRD 
PARTY RIGHTS AND NO PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE IS 
IMPLICATED IN THIS CASE. 
The public policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements only comes into 
play upon a finding that a party has agreed to arbitrate. "[Although there is a 
presumption in favor of arbitration, a party will not be required to arbitrate when it has 
not agreed to do so." Cade v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1076 -1077 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998)(citations omitted). The burden is on the party seeking to compel 
arbitration to demonstrate the existence of a valid and binding agreement. Mohamed v. 
Auto Nation USA Corp., 89 S.W. 3d 830, 835 (Ct. App. Tex. 2002). This proof may not 
be by mere inference, but "direct and specific evidence of an agreement between the 
parties" is required. McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31, ^ 17, 20 
P.3d 901, 905. It is undisputed in this case that neither Lisa Bybee nor the heirs agreed to 
the terms of the arbitration contract. 
Abdulla raises a parade of horribles regarding patient privacy and confidential 
relationship between physicians and patients. However, the specters raised by Abdulla 
under the rubric "public policy" cannot overcome the more fundamental issue before the 
court: whether the rights of third-party nonsignatories may be controlled, jeopardized, or 
eliminated entirely and unilaterally. Furthermore, the realities differ significantly from 
the speculative fears urged by Abdulla. 
Abdulla first argues that there are concerns regarding the privacy of the patient. 
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However if the patient wants to unilaterally eliminate the rights of third parties, he or she 
cannot be surprised or claim "privacy" by requiring those parties whose rights are at issue 
be informed. Abdulla presents no substantive reason as to why the waiver of the right to 
court access and jury trial for wrongful death suits cannot be made by those who would 
ultimately hold the claim. 
Abdulla similarly argues that informing those who hold the claims for wrongful 
death in the right to jury trial in court access would invade upon the "confidential 
relationship." But the upshot of Abdulla's argument is that any waiver would be done in 
secret, and be maintained in secret, until it was far too late for anyone who held those 
rights to argue against the waiver. Under Utah Code Ann. §78-14-17(l)(a)(vii) (2004), a 
patient must revoke any arbitration contract within 10 days following signature. Indeed, 
it appears that even if the patient died within that 10 days the heirs in a wrongful death 
suit would be incapable of revocation based on the language that "a patient" must make 
the revocation. (Appellant's Appendix 1). 
Abdulla urges the significance of the patient's personal privacy rights with respect 
to medical matters. The irony here is that a defendant physician would no doubt 
completely open up these alleged privacy rights in the name of 'discovery' while 
defending a lawsuit. More importantly, however, Abdulla himself should not be allowed 
to raise his patient's privacy rights in order to defend himself. 
Abdulla also, once again, turns to California law to support the proposition that the 
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patient's rights to contract somehow take precedent over the independent constitutional 
rights of third parties. As is so often the situation with California lower court authorities, 
the confusing and contradictory patchwork of case law fails to advance any meaningful 
analysis under Utah law. In Baker v. Birnbaum, 202 Cal.App.3d 288, 248 Cal.Rptr. 336 
(Cal.App. 2 Dist.,1988) a California court came to opposite conclusion is that reached by 
the authority relied upon by Abdulla, Gross v. Recabaren, 206 Cal.App.3d 771, 775, 253 
Cal.Rptr. 820, 822 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.,1988). 
In Baker, one spouse contracted solely for medical services for herself and in 
doing so signed an arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement in Baker governed 
"any dispute as to medical malpractice." Baker, 202 Cal.App.3d. at 290. Later, the wife 
developed cancer. The wife brought a lawsuit against the physician for medical 
malpractice while the husband brought a lawsuit for loss of consortium. The health care 
providers attempted to assert the arbitration agreement and forced the husband into 
arbitration. The Baker court declined. "Arbitration assumes, however, an election by the 
parties involved to use it as an alternative to the judicial process. A party cannot be 
compelled to arbitrate a dispute it has not elected to submit." Id. at 291. This apparent 
split amongst the California authorities remains unresolved by either the California 
Supreme Court or the California Legislature to date. 
No question exists that Mr. Bybee's privacy rights and rights of personal 
determination are important. However, those rights simply fail to come into play with 
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regard to whether or not potential heirs in a wrongful death claim should be informed of 
the waiver of their claims in a timely manner allowing them to5 at the very least, have 
input or be put on notice. In sum, no dispute exists that Mr. Bybee should be protected in 
his privacy rights, but this does not give him free reign to secretly eliminate the 
fundamental constitutional rights of his heirs and spouse. 
V. IF MRS. BYBEE SAW ANY BENEFIT IN PARTICIPATING IN 
ARBITRATION, THIS CASE WOULD NOT BE BEFORE THE 
COURT. 
Contrary to the assertions of Abdulla, Lisa Bybee's suit is one grounded in tort, not 
contract. Although there are cases compelling non-signatories to arbitration through a 
'third-party' beneficiary theory, all of these cases involve a suit based on the contract 
itself. To this extent, the third-party beneficiary rule as applied to compel a non-
signatory to participate in arbitration should actually be viewed as a theory under 
equitable estoppel. For example, in Peltz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 367 F.Supp.2d 711, 
719 (E.D.Pa. 2005) the plaintiffs brought a wrongful death claim when their parent died 
from heat exhaustion. The defendant, Sears, allegedly failed to timely repair the air 
conditioning unit under a maintenance agreement with the deceased. The maintenance 
agreement also required arbitration of any claims brought thereunder. 
The court held the heirs were required to participate in arbitration because their 
cause of action arose only as a result of the maintenance agreement which contained the 
arbitration clause. "Under the equitable estoppel theory, a non-signatory to a contract will 
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be compelled to arbitrate if he or she knowingly exploits the agreement. The policy 
behind this rule is to prevent a non-signatory from embracing a contract, and then turning 
its back on the portions of the contract, such as an arbitration clause, that it finds 
distasteful." Id. at 719. Because the wrongful death claims relied upon the maintenance 
agreement, and the maintenance agreement was incorporated by reference in the 
pleadings of the plaintiff, the wrongful death heirs were not free to ignore the arbitration 
clause. 
Similarly, the case cited by Abdulla also involved allegations sounding in and 
depending upon the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. Terminix Intern. 
Co., LPv. Ponzio, 693 So.2d 104, 105 (Fla.App. 5 Dist. 1997)(plaintiff alleged "that 
Terminix breached the agreement by failing to control or eradicate all pests listed in the 
pest control service agreement and that as a direct and proximate result of Terminix's 
breach, the plaintiffs suffered bodily injury."). Although the court characterized this as 
compelling a third-party beneficiary to participate in arbitration, the reality is that the very 
claims brought were dependent upon the underlying contract. Accordingly, the theory 
should more accurately be characterized as equitable estoppel. 
Considering the lengthy history of the wrongful death action in Utah being one 
considered wholly independent and not derivative, the cases relied upon by Abdulla 
applying equitable estoppel cannot bind the heirs in this case. Simply put, Lisa Bybee's 
claim against Dr. Abdulla does not depend upon the arbitration agreement. Rather, Lisa 
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Bybee's claim for herself and the heirs arises out of professional negligence and the 
constitutionally protected cause of action for wrongful death. 
On a broader note, this Court should consider the long-running effect that a 
decision binding a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement may have. Specifically, left 
unchecked adhesive arbitration agreements will ultimately work their way into every 
aspect of a consumer's life. Furthermore, these agreements may include boilerplate 
language which not only waives the right court access and a jury trial, but also somehow 
limits the ability of arbitrators to award punitive damages, damages for pain and 
suffering, or even special damages leaving the arbitrator to award nothing more than the 
strict consequential damages from the breach of contract. Indeed, Terminix, the 
defendant in the case relied upon by Abdulla incorporates these very terms into its 
contracts. See, Carll v. Terminix International Co., L.P., 793 A.2d 921, 924 (Pa.Super. 
2002)(service contract with arbitration clause denied "the arbitrator the authority to award 
damages for personal injury which is alleged to have been caused by the application of a 
pesticide product in and around Appellees' home."). 
Abdulla contends that three benefits are conferred by the arbitration agreement. 
First, arbitration allegedly constitutes a "speedy and inexpensive method." Speedy and 
inexpensive may be accurate relative to the commercial context where arbitration 
originally arose between parties dealing at arms length. Complex litigation between 
corporations can become a lengthy, arduous and very expensive process. However, 
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Abdulla cites nothing to demonstrate that arbitration in the personal injury arena speeds a 
result. Further, the costs of arbitration will no doubt result in a chilling effect upon 
plaintiffs forced to pay an incredibly high hourly rate for 1.5 arbitrators over a period of 
several days, if not a week. A severely injured plaintiff, potentially out of work or 
suffering the loss of primary income due to the death of the sole wage earner in the family 
will no doubt think twice before pursuing a claim when presented with the costs 
associated in paying up to $350 per hour for arbitrators. 
Abdulla further urges as a benefit involved in arbitration is the "easing court 
congestion." (Appellant's Brief at 15). Once again, Abdulla's position fails to match the 
reality. For the fiscal year 2005 there were 262 total malpractice cases filed in the state of 
Utah. See, Utah Courts Caseload Statistics 
http://www.utcourts.gov/stats/FY05/dist/fV2005_9.htm . There were a total of 252,571 
cases filed overall. Even if each and every one of those malpractice cases in 2005 had 
been subject to an arbitration agreement, it cannot be argued with any sincerity that this 
will somehow ease court congestion, let alone how such a minimal reduction would 
benefit Lisa Bybee. 
Finally, Abdulla maintains a further benefit of arbitration will be that the 
proceedings become "private, not public." This argument assumes that Lisa Bybee and 
the heirs in this case desire a private outcome. Abdulla has not demonstrated that this is 
in fact the case nor has Abdulla demonstrated any significant benefit to be derived as a 
39 
result of a private proceeding. 
More importantly, our court system not only operates on the premise that the 
injured must be compensated for negligence of another, but also that there is a public 
vindication of rights as against the tortfeasor. The public vindication serves to deter 
future conduct which may result in harm. In tort law "courts are concerned not only with 
compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer. When the decisions 
of the courts become known, and defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is 
of course a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of harm." W. Page Keeton et al, 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4 at 25 (5th ed. 1984).13 Privatizing the 
tort system by imposing private arbitration upon parties who never agreed to it in the first 
place simply cannot stand without simultaneously undermining the foundations and 
function of a public judiciary in addressing tortious conduct. 
Abdulla cites no case compelling a nonsignatory to become an unwilling 
beneficiary to an arbitration agreement, except those cases where the cause of action was 
premised on the same contract incorporating the arbitration clause. At the end of the day, 
it cannot be disputed that if Lisa Bybee viewed a private arbitration, and paying 
arbitrators up to a rate of $350 per hour as beneficial, she would have agreed to 
arbitration and this case would not currently stand before the Court. As the trial court 
13
 See, also, Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 976 (Utah 
1993)(acknowledging deterrent function of the tort system). 
40 
concluded "[i]t defies common sense to claim that Mrs. Bybee is a third party beneficiary 
to an agreement when the option she wishes to exercise, i.e., having her claim adjudicated 
in court, has been terminated by that agreement if it is enforced." (R. 168). 
VI. BECAUSE THIS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT VIOLATES 
RULES REGARDING PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE 
CONSCIONABILITY, THE AGREEMENT MUST BE 
INVALIDATED. 
Prior to finding that the arbitration contract can bind wrongful death heirs, the 
Court must first find that there is a valid arbitration agreement. In McCoy, the Utah 
Supreme Court held "the policy of liberally construing agreements in favor of arbitration 
is conditioned upon the prior determination that arbitration is a remedy freely bargained 
for by the parties." 2001 UT 31, U 15. Even if the arbitration agreement could be applied 
to eliminate the significant constitutional rights to jury trial, court access and the cause of 
action for wrongful death, no enforceable agreement to arbitrate exists in this case. 
Arbitration agreements between patients and physicians may only be enforced "if 
they meet the standards applicable to all contracts." Sosa, 924 P.2d at 359. As such, 
arbitration agreements resulting in unconscionability remain unenforceable. Id. Courts 
divide unconscionability into two separate branches: procedural unconscionability 
focusing on the formation of the agreement; and, substantive unconscionability focusing 
on the agreement's contents. Id. at 360. In effect, procedural unconscionability is found 
by "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties" and substantive 
unconscionability arises where the terms "are unreasonably favorable to the other party." 
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Id. 
Procedural unconscionability results when there is no meaningful choice on the 
part of one party. Factors contributing to procedural unconscionability include: (1) 
whether a party could ask questions to aid in understanding the terms and conditions; (2) 
whether the party could meaningfully negotiate those terms once understood; (3) whether 
the agreement presented boilerplate language drafted solely by the stronger party; (4) 
whether the stronger party actually explained the terms; (5) whether the weaker party had 
a meaningful choice or instead felt compelled to accept the terms; and, (6) whether the 
stronger party employed practices to obscure provisions. Sosa, 924 P.2d at 362. 
In this case, the arbitration contract and procedure for signing violate every factor 
employed by Utah courts in finding procedural unconscionability. The only evidence 
available at the time of signing shows that the contract was never explained to Mark 
Bybee. In the line to be signed by the person from Dr. Abdulla's office, Mark Bybee's 
name appears. (R. 21). Because Mark filled in the blank where he was supposed to sign, 
it is more likely than not the case that no one explained any of the four documents to him. 
Mark was presented with a stack of documents, four different boilerplate forms, to be 
filled out. Although Abdulla submitted affidavits below alleging explanation, those 
affidavits were never notarized. Further, Abdulla's Affidavit alleges "I and/or my staff 
had a discussion with Mark Bybee." (R. 43, ^  2). The affidavit clearly lacks a basis in 
personal knowledge where it fails to definitively state who actually conversed with Mr. 
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Bybee. Although the trial court concluded that Mark Bybee signed the arbitration 
contract, there is no factual conclusion that Mark Bybee actually received an 
explanation.14 Finally, the individual heirs, whose rights are at stake in this case, were 
never given any opportunity to knowingly waive those rights in favor of arbitration. 
Because Abdulla never presented the agreement to Lisa Bybee, the process provides no 
procedural safeguards and violates all factors considered in finding procedural 
unconscionability. 
Even absent procedural unconscionability, arbitration agreements may still be 
unenforceable due solely to substantive unconscionability. "Gross disparity in terms, 
absent evidence of procedural unconscionability, can support a finding of 
unconscionability." Sosa, 924 P.2d at 361. Abdulla retains the right to seek judicial 
redress for claims against his patients. "[T]he physician may pursue a legal action to 
collect any fee from the patient and doing so shall not waive the Physician's right to 
compel arbitration." (R. 38, Appellant's Appendix 1 at Article 1). If arbitration 
represents a 'speedy and inexpensive method,' then Abdulla should embrace it for 
resolution of the only possible claim he could have against patients, recovery of his fees. 
Yet, Abdulla instead opts out of arbitration for his claims and forces patients to 
arbitrate "all disputes and claims of any kind for injuries and losses arising from the 
14
 On this matter, the trial court as finder of fact should be accorded a 
discretionary standard of review. 
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medical care rendered." (R. 38, Appellant's Appendix 1 at Article 1). The agreement 
provides none of the procedural protections afforded through the judicial system. 
Additionally, the agreement eliminates any right to an appeal of an adverse decision. 
"We expressly waive all rights to pursue any legal action to seek damages or any other 
remedies in a court of law, including the right to a jury or court trial." (R. 38, Appellant's 
Appendix 1 at Article 2). Abdulla's unilateral retention of his significant constitutional 
right to seek judicial redress and the co-existing right to an appeal, while compelling 
third-party heirs and patients to forego there own rights, results in a gross disparity of 
terms and requires a finding that the contract is unconscionable and therefore 
unenforceable. 
CONCLUSION 
Enforcing arbitration agreements against third-party non-signatories eliminates 
important constitutional rights. No statute enables a patient to give up the constitutional 
rights of his heirs to court redress by a jury. Even assuming the 2004 Act could apply 
retroactively, Abdulla's construction once again impermissibly infringes upon these same 
rights and creates a statute ripe with constitutional infirmity. Of course, enforcement of 
the arbitration agreement to unilaterally infringe on these rights assumes a valid 
arbitration agreement. However, Abdulla cannot demonstrate the existence of a valid and 
enforceable agreement in this case. Abdulla's agreement fails to satisfy all the 
requirements under the 2004 Act. Even if an enforceable agreement existed, it violates 
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both procedural and substantive conscionability. The circumstances under which the 
agreement is signed lack procedural safeguards, especially as to the third-party heirs 
whose rights secretly disappear under the agreement. Finally, because Abdulla retains in 
himself the right of court access while simultaneously eliminating the rights of his 
patients, as well as non-signatory rights, substantive unconscionability prohibits 
enforcement. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART II. Actions, Venue, Limitation of Actions 
CHAPTER 14. MALPRACTICE ACTIONS AGAINST HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 
78-14-17 Arbitration agreements. 
(1) After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and a 
health care provider to be validly executed or, if the requirements of this Subsec-
tion (1) have not been previously met on at least one occasion, renewed: 
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing and by verbal explanation, the fol-
lowing information on: 
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate a claim instead of hav-
ing the claim heard by a judge or jury; 
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in which arbitrators are se-
lected under the agreement; 
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitration-related costs 
under the agreement; 
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into the agreement and 
still receive health care if Subsection (2) applies; 
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each year unless the agreement is 
canceled in writing before the renewal date; 
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about the arbitration agree-
ment answered; and 
(vii) the right of the patient to rescind the agreement within 30 days of 
signing the agreement; and 
(b) the agreement shall require that: 
(i) one arbitrator be collectively selected by all persons claiming damages; 
(ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care provider; 
(iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all persons claiming damages 
and the health care provider from a list of individuals approved as arbit-
rators by the state or federal courts of Utah; 
(iv) all parties waive the requirement of Section 78-14-12 to appear before 
a hearing panel in a malpractice action against a health care provider; 
(v) the patient be given the right to rescind the agreement within 3 0 days 
of signing the.agreement; and 
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(vi) the term of the agreement be for one year and that the agreement be 
automatically renewed each year unless the agreement is canceled in writing 
by the patient or health care provider before the renewal date. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) , a patient may not be denied health care of any 
kind from the emergency department of a general acute hospital, as defined in Sec-
tion 26-21-2, on the sole basis that the patient or a person described in Subsection 
(5) refused to enter into a binding arbitration agreement with a health care pro-
vider. 
(3) A written acknowledgment of having received a written and verbal explanation of 
a binding arbitration agreement signed by or on behalf of the patient shall be a de-
fense to a claim that the patient did not receive a written and verbal explanation 
of the agreement as required by Subsection (1) unless the patient: 
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement lacked the capacity to do 
so; or 
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the agreement 
was induced by the health care provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent mis-
representation or fraudulent omission to state material facts. 
(4) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by a binding 
arbitration agreement that was executed or renewed before May 3, 1999. 
(5) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection 78-14-5(4), except a person 
temporarily standing in loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitration 
agreement on behalf of a patient. 
(6) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement that is subject to the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-17, enacted by L. 1999, ch. 278, § 1; 2003, ch. 207, § 3. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. --The 2 003 amendment, effective May 5, 2 003, added "if Subsection 
(2) applies" at the end of Subsection (1)(a)(iv); added Subsection (1)(a)(vii); and 
inserted "from the emergency department of a general acute hospital, as defined in 
Section 26-21-2" in Subsection (2). 
Sunset.--See Section 63-55-278 for the repeal date of this section. 
Effective Dates. --Laws 1999, ch. 278 became effective on May 3, 1999, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Copyright ® 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 78, JUDICIAL CODE 
PART II. ACTIONS, VENUE, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
CHAPTER 14. UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT 
§ 78-14-17. Arbitration agreements 
(1) After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and a 
health care provider to be validly executed or, if the requirements of this Subsec-
tion (1) have not been previously met on at least one occasion, renewed: 
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing, the following information on: 
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate a claim instead of having the 
claim heard by a judge or jury; 
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in which arbitrators are selected 
under the agreement; 
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitration-related costs under 
the agreement; 
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into the agreement and still 
receive health care if Subsection (3) applies; 
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each year unless the agreement is can-
celed in writing before the renewal date; 
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about the arbitration agreement 
answered; 
(vii) the right of the patient to rescind the agreement within ten days of sign-
ing the agreement; and 
(viii) the right of the patient to require mediation of the dispute prior to the 
arbitration of the dispute; 
(b) the agreement shall require that: 
(i) except as provided in Subsection (1)(b)(ii), a panel of three arbitrators 
shall be selected as follows: 
(A) one arbitrator collectively selected by all persons claiming damages; 
(B) one arbitrator selected by the health care provider; and 
(C) a third arbitrator: 
(I) jointly selected by all persons claiming damages and the health care pro-
vider; or 
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(II) if both parties cannot agree on the selection of the third arbitrator, 
the other two arbitrators shall appoint the third arbitrator from a list of 
individuals approved as arbitrators by the state or federal courts of Utah; 
or 
(ii) if both parties agree, a single arbitrator may be selected; 
(iii) all parties waive the requirement of Section 78-14-12 to appear before a 
hearing panel in a malpractice action against a health care provider; 
(iv) the patient be given the right to rescind the agreement within ten days of 
signing the agreement; 
(v) the term of the agreement be for one year and that the agreement be automat-
ically renewed each year unless the agreement is canceled in writing by the pa-
tient or health care provider before the renewal date; 
(vi) the patient has the right to retain legal counsel; 
(vii) the agreement only apply to: 
(A) an error or omission that occurred after the agreement was signed, provided 
that the agreement may allow a person who would be a proper party in court to 
participate in an arbitration proceeding; 
(B) the claim of: 
(I) a person who signed the agreement; 
(II) a person on whose behalf the agreement was signed under Subsection (6); 
and 
(III) the unborn child of the person described in this Subsection 
(1)(b)(vii)(B), for 12 months from the date the agreement is signed; and 
(C) the claim of a person who is not a party to the contract if the sole basis 
for the claim is an injury sustained by a person described in Subsection 
(1)(b)(vii)(B); and 
(c) the patient shall be verbally encouraged to: 
(i) read the written information required by Subsection (1)(a) and the arbitra-
tion agreement; and 
(ii) ask any questions. 
(2) When a medical malpractice action is arbitrated, the action shall: 
(a) be subject to Chapter 31a, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act; and 
(b) include any one or more of the following when requested by the patient before 
an arbitration hearing is commenced: 
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(i) mandatory mediation; 
(ii) retention of the jointly selected arbitrator for both the liability and dam-
ages stages of an arbitration proceeding if the arbitration is bifurcated; and 
(iii) the filing of the panel's award of damages as a judgement against the pro-
vider in the appropriate district court. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) , a patient may not be denied health care on the 
sole basis that the patient or a person described in Subsection (6) refused to enter 
into a binding arbitration agreement with a health care provider. 
(4) A written acknowledgment of having received a written explanation of a binding 
arbitration agreement signed by or on behalf of the patient shall be a defense to a 
claim that the patient did not receive a written explanation of the agreement as re-
quired by Subsection (1) unless the patient: 
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement lacked the capacity to do so; 
or 
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the agreement was 
induced by the health care provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresent-
ation or fraudulent omission to state material facts. 
(5) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by a binding 
arbitration agreement that was executed or renewed before May 3, 1999. 
(6) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection 78-14-5(4), except a person 
temporarily standing in loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitration 
agreement on behalf of a patient. 
(7) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement that is subject to the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq. 
Laws 1999, c. 278, S 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2003, c. 207, S 3, eff. May 5, 2003; 
Laws 2004, c. 83, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
SUNSET PROVISIONS 
<For repeal affecting § 78-14-17, regarding medical malpractice arbitration 
agreements, see § 63-55-278.> 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2003, c. 207, added "if Subsection (2) applies" at the end of subsec. 
(1)(a)(iv), added subsec. (1)(a)(vii), and inserted in subsec. (2) "from the emer-
gency department of a general acute hospital, as defined in Section 26- 21-2". 
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Laws 2004, c. 83, rewrote this section that formerly provided: 
11
 (1) After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and a 
health care provider to be validly executed or, if the requirements of this Subsec-
tion (1) have not been previously met on at least one occasion, renewed: 
11
 (a) the patient shall be given, in writing and by verbal explanation, the following 
information on: 
"(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate a claim instead of having the 
claim heard by a judge or jury; 
11
 (ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in which arbitrators are selected un-
der the agreement; 
"(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitration-related costs under the 
agreement; 
"(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into the agreement and still re-
ceive health care if Subsection (2) applies; 
"(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each year unless the agreement is can-
celed in writing before the renewal date; 
"(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about the arbitration agreement 
answered; and 
"(vii) the right of the patient to rescind the agreement within 3 0 days of signing 
the agreement; and 
"(b) the agreement shall require that: 
"(i) one arbitrator be collectively selected by all persons claiming damages; 
11
 (ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care provider; 
11
 (iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all persons claiming damages and 
the health care provider from a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the 
state or federal courts of Utah; 
11
 (iv) all parties waive the requirement of Section 78-14-12 to appear before a hear-
ing panel in a malpractice action against a health care provider; 
"(v) the patient be given the right to rescind the agreement within 3 0 days of sign-
ing the agreement; and 
"(vi) the term of the agreement be for one year and that the agreement be automatic-
ally renewed each year unless the agreement is canceled in writing by the patient or 
health care provider before the renewal date. 
"(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be denied health care of any 
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kind from the emergency department of a general acute hospital, as defined in Sec-
tion 26-21-2, on the sole basis that the patient or a person described in Subsection 
(5) refused to enter into a binding arbitration agreement with a health care pro-
vider. 
"(3) A written acknowledgment of having received a written and verbal explanation of 
a binding arbitration agreement signed by or on behalf of the patient shall be a de-
fense to a claim that the patient did not receive a written and verbal explanation 
of the agreement as required by Subsection (1) unless the patient: 
"(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement lacked the capacity to do so; 
or 
11
 (b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the agreement was 
induced by the health care provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion or fraudulent omission to state material facts. 
"(4) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by a bind-
ing arbitration agreement that was executed or renewed before May 3, 1999. 
"(5) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection 78-14-5(4), except a per-
son temporarily standing in loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitra-
tion agreement on behalf of a patient. 
"(6) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement that is subject to the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq." 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, see S 78-31b-l et seq. 
Alternative dispute resolution, court-annexed program in civil cases, see Jud. 
Admin., Rule 4-510. 
Arbitration and mediation, generally, see ADR, Rule 101 et seq. 
Uniform Arbitration Act, see § 78-31a-101 et seq. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Arbitration €=^6, 7.3, 7.5, 26, 2.2. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 33k6; 33k7.3; 33k7.5; 33k26; 33k2.2. 
C.J.S. Arbitration SS 7. 1£, 14. to H , 21 to 22., 24, 60, to 62.. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-14-17, UT ST § 78-14-17 
Current through the end of the 2004 4th Spec. Sess. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Appellant cites the following cases for the proposition that "[c]ourts in other jurisdictions also 
agree that the heirs are subject to the contracts of the decedent in wrongful death actions, 
including arbitration agreements." 
Case Cite 
Allen v. Pacheco, 71 
P.3d 375 (Colo. 2003) 
Ballard v. Southwest 
Detroit Hospital, 327 
N.W.2d 370 (1982) 
Jansen v. Salomon 
Smith Barney, Inc., 776 
A.2d816(App.Div. 
J 2001) 
Smith, Barney, Inc. v. 
Henry, 775 So.2d 722 
(Miss. 2001) 
Collins v. Merrill 
Lynch, et. al, 561 So. 
2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 
J 1990) 
American Bureau of 
Shipping v. Tenacara 
\ Shipyard, 170F.3d349 
1 (2nd Cir. 1999) 
Seborowski v. 
Pittsburgh Press Co., 
188 F.3d 163 (3rd Cir. 
1999) 
Holding 
Refused to enforce 
arbitration agreement 
against spouse because it 
failed to striclty comply 
with statutory 
requirements. 
Refused to enforce 
agreement, but 
arbitration could bind 
heirs because under 
Michigan law, wrongful 
death a derivative cause 
of action. 
Brokerage and securities 
agreement compelled 
arbitration by heirs in 
suit against brokerage. 
Brokerage and securities 
agreement compelled 
arbitration by heirs in 
suit against brokerage. 
Brokerage and securities 
agreement compelled 
arbitration by heirs in 
suit against brokerage. 
International yacht 
builders, owners and 
insurers required to 
arbitrate. 
Employees bound by 
collective bargaining 
agreement entered into 











at issue; court found 
agreement inherently 
unconscionable. 












No wrongful death or 
other constitutional 
rights at issue. 
Appeal from 
unfavorable 
arbitration result, no 











In re Oil Spill by the 
Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d 
789 (7th Cir. 1981) ' 
Briar cliff Nursing 
Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 
894So.2d661(Ala. 
1 2004) 
Wilkerson v. Nelson, 
395 F. Supp.2d281, 
289 (M.D.N.C. 2005) 
Pelz v. Sears, Roebuck 
cfeCa,367F.Supp.2d 
711, 718-19 (E.D. Pa. 
2005) 
County of Contra Costa 
v. Kaiser Foundation 
Health Plan, Inc., 54 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 628, 632 
(1996) 
Holding 
Arbitration of tanker j 
owner's claim against 
tug owner required under 
Lloyd's standard salvage 
agreement. 
Arbitration enforceable 
in claim by decedent's 
estate against nursing 
home. 
Arbitration of wrongful 
death enforceable, 
wrongful death claim is 
"legally derivative." 
j Arbitration of wrongful 
death claims required 
where claims premised 
on contract which gave 
rise to the claim for 
wrongful death. 




cases are grounded in the 
authority of the signatory 
to contract for medical 
services on behalf of the 
nonsignatory-to bind the 
nonsignatory in some 
manner." 
Comment 
No wrongful death or 
constitutional issues. 




No wrongful death or 
constitutional issues 
discussed by main 
opinion; 
No mention of a 
constitutionally 
protected wrongful 




suit brought pursuant 
to failure of 
defendant to fulfill 
terms of maintenance 







signatories could not 
be compelled to 








Bolanos v. Khalatian, 
283 Cal. Rptr. 209 
(1991) 
NORCAL Mutual ins. 
Co. v. Newton, 100 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 683 (2000) 
Harris v. Superior 




claims by third-party 
spouse. 
Arbitration governed 
claims by wife against 
insurance company 
where she accepted 
benefit under policy. 
Physician compelled to 
arbitrate because 
"voluntary acceptance of 
the benefit of a 
transaction constitutes 
consent to all the 
obligations arising from 





death, court access or 
jury trial. 
By accepting the 
benefits of the 
insurance contract, 





right to jury or court 
access arguments 
raised, wrongful 
death not at issue. 
Outcome 
Enforceable 
Enforceable 
Enforceable 
